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REGULATION X: A COMPLEXIS
I. Introduction
Until recently the margin prohibitions of the Securities Exchange Act of
1934' were addressed exclusively to those who extended credit in securities
transactions. No responsibilities or restrictions were imposed upon the private
borrower. Therefore, in any transaction in which credit for the purchase of
securities was extended, the lender had the burden of observing margin require-
ments. Although the Securities Act provides only for publicly enforced sanctions,
courts have found lenders liable in private actions for damages suffered by
borrowers in illegal transactions.
In 1971, however, Congress passed legislation prohibiting the borrower
from accepting illegal credit.2 This legislation was implemented through the
Federal Reserve Board which promulgated Regulation X.' Because both the
borrower and lender now have the burden of observing margin regulations,
private actions have changed drastically.
This note analyzes the private actions brought by borrowing investors against
lenders for losses incurred in illegal transactions in light of the new legislation
and regulation. This will be done by discussing the particular types of actions
which could have been brought by borrowers before the issuance of Regulation
X and the expected effect of the Regulation upon each. It is necessary initially
to discuss the reasoning behind margin provisions generally and to define the
transactions subject to regulation.
II. Purposes of Margin Control
Section 7 of the Securities Exchange Act first imposed Congressional control
on securities credit. It directed that:
for the purpose of preventing the excessive use of credits for the purchase
or carrying of securities, the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve
System shall,... prescribe rules and regulations with respect to the amount
of credit that may be initially extended and subsequently maintained on
any security (other than an exempted security) .'
It is important to note that the Act was promulgated in response to the stock
market crash of 1929 and the Great Depression that followed. Regulation of
margin transactions was one attempt to deal with these two events and also
provide continuing control in three distinct areas.
National credit supply, and in a large sense overall monetary policy, was
the foremost consideration in both the original legislation and today's provisions.5
1 15 U.S.C. § 78a et seq. (1971) as amended.
2 BANK RECORDS & FoREION TRANSACTIONS ACT oF 1970, TITLE III, 84 Stat. 1124,
15 U.S.C. § 78g(f) (1971).
3 12 C.F.R. § 224 (1973).
4 15 U.S.C. § 78g(a) (1971) as amended.
5 See 15 U.S.C. § 78b (1971).
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The Federal Reserve can control the economy's supply of money by regulating
the amount of credit available. Margin buying, as a type of credit transaction,
has an effect upon overall money availability and particularly upon the money
available for businesses with widespread ownership. Regulation of margin also
can be used to direct the use of credit into particular sectors of the economy.
Loosening margin requirements directs more money towards business and
tightening them frees money for other uses. More importantly, stock market
fluctuations bring about abrupt changes in the amount of credit demanded by
investors. Such changes, which have a volatile effect on the monetary system,
can be reduced by limiting the amount of credit available. Furthermore, trans-
actions involving a great amount of credit have been criticized as responsible
for the explosive nature of stock market fluctuations.
Controls also serve to protect the financial community. The brokers able
to secure the greatest financing attract many customers. However, high leverage
financing in a fast-moving market frequently results in substantial difficulties for
borrowers. As stock values fall, brokers make margin calls and those who have
margined heavily often decide to do one of two things. They either sell the
stock themselves, thus depressing the market even further to the detriment of
the investment community, or they fail to meet the margin call and the broker
sells out their accounts with debit balances remaining. Brokers are often unable
to collect the balances and find themselves in financial difficulties. This problem
is obviated not only by Federal Reserve Board requirements of sufficient margin
upon initial purchase but also by "maintenance margins" which are demanded
by the stock exchanges.6
Finally, protection of the borrower himself must be given consideration.
The economically weak and those not sophisticated in securities trading are
prevalent margin borrowers. They find it necessary to sell as soon as the market
goes down and, in depressing the market, force their remaining collateral into
jeopardy. Upon receiving a margin call that they cannot meet, they soon find
themselves outside the securities market altogether and much poorer for the
experience.7 By forcing all investors to be margined sufficiently to weather small
storms, the regulations can save them from their own weaknesses.
III. Regulations on Securities Credit
The Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System has promulgated
several regulations in order to effectuate the considerations discussed above.
Regulation TP determines the initial minimum margin requirements that brokers
and dealers9 may extend to their customers. Most of these credit transactions
take place through either the customer's general account or special cash
6 New York Stock Exchange Rule 431. 2 CCH NY STocx ExcE. GuroE % 2431 (1970).
7 Congress recognized that "protection of the small speculator by making it impossible for
him to spread himself too thin ... will be achieved as a by-product of the main purpose."
H.R. RP. No. 1383, 73rd Cong., 2d Sess. (1934).
8 12 C.F.R. § 220 (1973).
9 Regulation T applies to all brokers and dealers as defined in sections 3(a), (4) and (5)
of the 1934 Act. 15 U.S.C. 78c(a) (4) and (5) (1971).
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account.' Section 3 of the Regulation prohibits a creditor from effecting for
any customer with a general account" any transaction which creates an excess
of credit over the maximum value of the securities unless, within five business
days following the transaction, the account is "brought up" to the current
margin requirements. 2 If the creditor fails to do so, the broker or dealer must
immediately cancel the transaction by selling the securities which are under-
margined 3 or obtain an extension of time from the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC) in which to qualify with the margin requirements. Cash
transactions handled in a special cash account must be paid within seven business
days after the transaction.' 4 However, if payment is to be made against the
delivery of the security by the broker, he may extend the period to thirty-five
days.' In either case if the account is not paid within the required time, the
broker must "promptly cancel or otherwise liquidate the transaction or the un-
settled portion thereof."' 6 The broker's failure to comply with any of the pro-
visions of this Regulation constitutes a violation of § 7 of the Act.
Regulation U applies to all banks. A loan comes within its proscriptions
if it is for the purpose of purchasing or "carrying" specified types of equity
securities and has as collateral some kind of stock.' "Carrying" is defined as
encompassing a loan made "for the purpose of reducing or retiring indebtedness
incurred to purchase that stock."'" The Regulation provides: "No bank shall
make any loan secured directly or indirectly by any stock for the purpose of
purchasing or carrying any margin stock in an amount exceeding the maximum
loan value of the collateral."' 9 Thus, banks are subject to controls similar to
those of brokers under Regulation T. However, since a bank creditor must
ordinarily obtain collateral for a loan before or at the time he makes the loan,
no general liquidation provision applies to banks.
Regulation G2" was promulgated in 1969 to cover all other domestic
lenders."1 Regulation G requires registration of every person who in the regular
10 A customer who has a general account buys stock on credit. He pays only part of the
purchase price in cash and receives an extension of credit for an indefinite period from the
broker for the balance. A special cash account also involves credit, but is set up by a broker
upon the reliance that the customer will make full cash payment for securities within a short
time.
See 2 L. Loss, SEcuassas REGULATION, 1248-56 (2d ed. 1961) [hereinafter cited as Loss].
11 12 C.F.R. § 220.3 (a) (1973):
"All financial relations between a creditor and a customer . . . shall be included in and
be deemed to be part of the customer's general account with the creditor, except that the
relations which § 220.4 permits to be included in any special account provided for by that
section may be included in the appropriate special account ... 
12 12 C.F.R. § 220.3(b) (1973).
13 12 G.F.R. § 22 0 .3(e) (1973).
14 12 'C.F.R. § 220.4(c) (1973). Although a broker or dealer may set up other types of
special accounts for customers, most margin transactions take place in the general and special
cash accounts. See 2 Loss at 1248-49.
15 12 C.F.R. § 220.3(f) (1973).
16 12 C.F.R. § 220.4(c) (2) (1973).
17 12 C.F.R. § 221.1(a) (1973).
18 12 G.F.R. § 221.3(b) (1973).
19 12 C.F.R. § 221.1(a) (1973). The loan value is prescribed from time to time at
12 C.F.R. § 221.4 (1973).
20 12 C.F.R. § 207 (1973).
21 A good summary of the history of securities credit regulation and its status as of 1971
is found in Soloman & Hart, Recent Developments in the Regulation of Securities Credit, 20
J. PUB. L. 167 (1971) [hereinafter cited as Soloman & Hart].
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course of business during any calendar quarter extends or arranges for extension
of $50,000 or more in credit, or has outstanding at any time during the calendar
quarter $100,000 or more, secured directly or indirectly, in whole or part, by
collateral that includes margin securities.22 These registrants then become subject
to general requirements similar to those provided by Regulation U. The Board
intended through this measure to treat similarly all persons who extend credit for
the purchase of securities in the ordinary course of their business.
Most recently Congress has become concerned with the control of the foreign
lender.2" Section 7 of the 1934 Act is silent on the matter of credit extended by
those outside the United States. 4 Nevertheless, some past cases implied that if
the effect of the transaction is felt in the United States, then the Act applied to
the transaction.25 However, in a more recent case, Metro-Goldwin-Mayer, Inc. U.
Transamerica Corporation,26 it was held that Regulations U and G did not apply
to foreign lenders. In response to cases such as this, Congress passed Title III of
the Bank Records and Foreign Transactions Act of 1970, amending § 7 of the
Securities Act of 1934. The amendment forbids:
any United States person, or any foreign person, or any foreign person con-
trolled by a United States person... to obtain, receive, or enjoy the benefi-
cial use of a loan.., from any lender for the purpose of (A) purchasing or
carrying within the United States of any other securities, if,... the loan...
is prohibited or would be prohibited if it had been made or the transaction
had otherwise occurred in a lender's office or other place of business in a
state.2Y
In effect, Congress determined that the only way to control foreign lenders was
to control the United States borrower.2' The legislation applies to all domestic
transactions and holds the borrower equally responsible with the lender for any
violation.
22 12 C.F.R. § 207.1(a) (1973).
23 See Soloman & Hart at 202-11.
24 15 U.S.C. § 78g (1971).
25 See Roth v. Fund of Funds, Ltd., 279 F. Supp. 935 (S.D.N.Y. 1968), aff'd 405 F.2d 421
(2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 975 (1969). A foreign-based mutual fund was held to
be transacting business in securities in the United States and was found liable for violations
of the 1934 Act. Id.
26 303 F.Supp. 1354 (S.D.N.Y. 1969).
27 15 U.S.C. § 78g(f) (1971).
28 When foreign financial secrecy is imposed upon the natural complexity of some of these
transactions, it is virtually impossible for the Securities and Exchange Commission to know
whether any laws are being violated. Moreover, the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 is pri-
marily a disclosure act and, with foreign financial secrecy, there can be no full disclosure. This
legislation will remedy much of this problem by extending the applicability of margin require-
ments under section 7 of the Securities Exchange Act to the purchases of stock as well as to
broker-dealers and financial institutions which lend money for that purpose. H.R. REP. No. 975,
91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1956).
The legislative history of this amendment has been reviewed by other writers. Soloman &
Hart, supra note 21, state that the committee reports express concern about the potentially
destabilizing effect of foreign credit on the domestic securities markets, and that the application
of margin requirements to United States borrowers is to prevent this. Id. at 210.
In a note it was concluded that both the House and Senate committees were primarily
concerned with secret foreign credit, its use in criminal activities, and its possible destabilizing
effect on the securities market. Regulation X and Investor-Lender Margin Violation Disputes,
57 MINN. L. Rv. 208, 219-20 (1972). Nothing significant has been found that shows con-




As did § 7 of the 1934 Act, Title III of the Bank Records Act delegated to
the Federal Reserve Board the responsibility of promulgating regulations to
execute the legislation. Regulation X was issued for this purpose. Its stated pur-
pose is to prevent the infusion into the securities markets of unregulated credit
obtained either outside or within the United States by borrowers attempting to
intentionally and wilfully circumvent the provisions of margin regulations."
Although the legislation provides that the Federal Reserve Board may exempt
any class of borrowers from the requirements, the Board declined to designate
such a class. Therefore, the Regulation applies to all domestic borrowers as well
as United States persons outside the United States."0 In essence it requires that
the borrower of domestic credit from T, G, or U lenders conform to the respective
regulations under which the lenders come and that the same requirements apply
to credit received from outside the United States.3 However, the regulation
provides that good-faith mistakes by borrowers in obtaining credit will not be
deemed to be a violation in the event that reasonable remedial action is taken
upon discovery of the violation. 2
IV. Public Enforcement of the Regulations
Although margin regulations are promulgated by the Federal Reserve
Board, enforcement is delegated to the Securities and Exchange Commission. The
SEC has chosen to do this through several alternative punitive actions which may
be taken against violators. The Commission may transmit evidence of violations
of margin regulations to the Attorney General's office where criminal prosecution
may be instituted."3 Injunctions for violations 4 may be issued as may be writs of
mandamus.3" Under certain circumstances the SEC may also suspend or revoke
the registration of any dealer or broker if it determines that doing so is in the
public interest.3 Furthermore, the Act of 1934 provides that before they may be
registered with the SEC, securities exchanges must have rules for disciplining
members.3 7 The National Association of Securities Dealers, Inc. (NASD) has
promulgated rules demanding minimum initial and maintenance margin require-
ments of its members." Members of NASD in violation of such rules may be
penalized by censure, fine, expulsion, or suspension."
29 12 C.F.R. § 224.1 (1973).
30 Id. § 224.2. It also applies to anyone who willfully aids or abets a violation by another.
31 Id. § 224.2.
32 Id. § 224.6.
33 15 U.S.C. § 78u(e) (1971). See e.g., United States v. Coggeshall & Hicks, CCH Fzs.
SEC. L. REP. 1 92,452 (1969-1970 Transfer Binder) (D.C.N.Y. 1969).
34 15 U.S.C. § 78u(e) (1971).
35 Id. § 78u(f).
36 15 U.S.C. 780 (b) (5). See In the Matter of Sackville-Pickard, [1967-1969 Transfer
Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. V 77,620 (1968).
37 15 U.S.C. § 78f(b) (1971). See Kroese v. New York Stock Exchange, 227 F.Supp. 519
(S.D.N.Y. 1964). The New York Stock Exchange has promulgated Rule 431, 2 CCH N.Y.
STOCK ExcH. Guma 2431 (1973), which governs both initial and maintenance margin re-
quirements. Violation of any rule, resolution or constitutional provision of the New York Stock
Exchange is grounds for expulsion or suspension. NEw YORK STOCK EXCHANGE, INC. CONST.
art. XIV § 6.
38 NASD RuLEs OF FAiR PRAcTicE, art. III, § 30.
39 Id. at art. V § 1.
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The effectiveness of public sanctions may be questioned because of the
problem of adequate enforcement. Margin violations are usually victimless
crimes since they are not committed with the purpose of harming anyone.
Therefore, few are reported by private interests for public action. Thus the
agencies are dependent upon their own investigations to uncover violations. A lack
of sufficient facilities and personnel prevents inspection of more than a fraction
of the registered broker-dealers each year by the SEC. A study for the Special
House Subcommittee on Investigations has found that the inability of the SEC
to adequately inspect broker-dealers on a regular basis has accentuated the
problems of the industry."0 The study reports that in May, 1970, the Commis-
sion's largest office had only ten inspectors for the 2,000 broker-dealers in its
area. As a result, inspections often occur as much as three years apart. The report
comments that even the inspections conducted are not comprehensive enough to
be effective. This report concludes that the Commission is ill-equipped to initiate
a sufficient number of thorough inspections each year."'
V. Private Enforcement
Most authorities agreed that prior to the promulgation of Regulation X,
a truly effective mechanism to enforce margin regulation was the private cause
of action which the customer had against a violating lender.4 2 Beginning with
Remar v. Clayton Securities Corp.,4 3 where a United States district court found
a broker who arranged financing in violation of Regulation U liable in tort to
his customer, securities lenders have known of the severe risks they take when
they violate margin regulations. In the typical case, a broker extended credit in
violation of a regulation and when the stock fell in price he sold the stock. Then
the customer sued to recover his loss. Even though recovery based upon tort was
attacked from a common law point of view," it was accepted by the courts..
Successful suits were also brought based upon common law contract as comple-
mented by federal statutes and regulations. 5 These two causes of action were
40 STAFF OF SPECIAL HOUSE SUBCOMMITTEE oN INVESTIGATIONS, 9 2 D CONG., IST SESS.,
REPORT ON REVIEW OF SEC RECORDS OF THE DEMISE OF SELECTED BROKERS DEALERS,
(Comm. Print 1971). The importance of the report becomes clear in this context when it is
noted that one of the purposes of § 7 of the 1934 Act is protection of the industry. See text
accompanying note 6 supra.
41 STAFF OF SPECIAL HOUSE SUBCOMMITTEE ON INVESTIGATIONS, note 40 supra. In fiscal
1959 when 1471 broker-dealers were inspected, 180 were found to be in financial difficulties and
170 were in violation of Regulation T. 2 Loss 1356. In 1967, of the 1019 broker-dealers in-
spected, 118 were having financial problems and 77 were in violation of Regulation T. 5 Loss
(2d ed. Supp. 1969).
42 5 Loss 3299 (Supp. 1969). The SEC appears to have favored private enforcement of
security regulation generally, and in the margin violation area has filed amicus briefs on the
part of customers, e.g., Warshaw v. H. Hentz & Co., 199 F.Supp. 581 (S.D.N.Y. 1961). See
generally, Shipman, Two Current Questions Concerning Private Rights of Action Under the
Exchange Act: Authority of the Administrative Agency to Negate; Existence for Violation of
Self-Regulatory Requirements, 17 W. RES. L. REv. 925, 942 (1966). But see Judge Friendly's
dissent in Pearlstein v. Scudder & German at 1147-48. See text accompanying note 143 infra.
43 81 F.Supp. 1014 (D. Mass. 1949).
44 Pearlstein v. Scudder & German, 429 F.2d 1136, 1147 (2d Cir. 1970) (dissenting
opinion); Note, Federal Margin Requirements as a Basis for Civil Liability, 66 COLUM. L. REV.
1462 (1966).
45 Goldenberg v. Bache and Company, 270 F.2d 675 (5th Cir. 1959).
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limited by the traditional defenses available in common law tort and contract. 6
More recently, however, some courts upheld customer recovery based upon not
only the broker's violation but also the importance of enforcement through pri-
vate actions. 7 One court, basing its decision on this rationale, held the customer's
subjective knowledge not a factor for consideration absent misstatements on his
part, and rejected ordinary defenses on the part of the lender.4" Under this view
the broker was almost strictly liable in damages to a customer whenever he vio-
lated margin regulations promulgated under § 7 of the Act.
The vitality of these private actions following the promulgation of Regula-
tion X is doubtful. When the customer accepts credit illegally he also violates § 7
and therefore may be precluded from recovery against his lender. Before Regula-
tion X became effective, the courts were inconsistent not only in the theories of
recovery for the customer but also in determining the situations in which recovery
was warranted. Now that the customer is in a more perilous legal position, the
issues are considerably less clear.49 Certainly, given the inefficiency of public
enforcement and the important effect of the private action as an enforcement
mechanism, a private sanction against the lender should still be available. How-
ever, analytical justification may be very difficult in light of the defenses available
to brokers in contract and tort law.
Ultimately the issue could be resolved if it could be decided which customers
ought to be able to recover damages. Equitably it would appear a division be-
tween "good faith" and "bad faith" investors would be rational. Unfortunately
customers cannot be categorized as "good faith" or "bad faith" customers. They
represent a continuum from the "lamb" type investor who would comply with
margin regulations if he had knowledge of them to the very sophisticated
customer who misrepresents himself to his broker. Courts have in the past been
consistent in permitting the "lamb" to recover. Conversely, although there are
exceptions,"0 most courts do not permit the misrepresenter to recover. Assessment
of the effect of the new amendment and Regulation X on the private cause of
action by the customer may most easily be made by examining each theory of
recovery separately.
A. Tort Actions
1. Prior to Regulation X
Most private actions have been brought in tort. The rationale has been
based upon an application of the rule that where a defendant's violation of a
46 To recover in tort proximate cause resulting in damages must be shown. See Smith v.
Bear, 237 F.2d 79, 87-88 (2d Gir. 1956) (dictum). In suit for breach of contract, if the plaintiff
survives in pari delicto, recovery is likely to be smaller than in tort. Privity is also a factor in
contract actions.
47 See Pearlstein v. Scudder & German, 429 F.2d 1136 (2d Cir. 1970); Avery v. Merrill
Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, 328 F.Supp. 677 (D.D.C. 1971).
48 Pearlstein v. Scudder & German, 429 F.2d 1136, 1141 (2d Cir. 1970).
49 One court had this to say about the effect of Regulation X on private enforcement of
margin violations: "Reference to the recent amendment to [the Securities Exchange Act of
1934] is futile. The act is a complexis. In the words of the bard, 'Confusion hath now made his
masterpiece.'" Spoon v. Walston & Co., 345 F.Supp. 518, 521 (E.D. Mich. 1972), quoting
Shakespeare, Macbeth, Act II, Scene II, aff'd per curiam, 478 F.2d 246 (6th Cir. 1973).
50 See text accompanying notes 97-101, infra.
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prohibitory statute has caused injury to the plaintiff, the latter has a right of
action if one of the purposes of the enactment is to protect interests similar to
those of the plaintiff's. In essence, it has been held that the lender is negligent in
his actions toward the borrower."" This rationale hangs from a fine thread. The
protection of the small investor from the dangers of excessive trading was only a
"by-product" and not an essential purpose of the 1934 Act. Nevertheless, courts
have been consistent in recognizing negligence on the part of the violator.52
Courts have not, however, been consistent in defining those parties who may
recover. The Remar court held that the customer's participation as a borrower
in the illegal transaction did not preclude recovery on his part. It was stated that
since the legislature regarded the borrower as incapable of protecting himself, he
was not prevented from suing for the injury he sustained.5 More recently, a
United States district court stated that it would:
not entertain a cacophony of blame on the part of the brokers and customers
-each blaming the other for not meeting the requirements-the ultimate re-
sponsibility must be placed somewhere and Congress has indicated that it is
with the brokers or dealers.54
This is perhaps the more widespread view. On the other hand, courts have stated
that the broker's tort liability is not absolute but is subject to the traditional con-
cepts of causation and contributory negligence. s The causation factor has been
attacked forcefully.5" At first glance, the argument that the market fluctuations
rather than the loan itself causes the customer's loss appears rather convincing.
Nevertheless, courts apparently have not accepted the argument. Some courts
have, however, required the plaintiff to show that he would not have bought the
stock had it been margined at a higher rate.57 This argument is not meaningful
in the context of Regulation T which requires the broker to sell the stock if not
margined properly. If the customer loses money because the value of improperly
margined stock falls after the date at which it was to be sold, the loss can be
directly attributed to the lender's lack of action.
Active and knowledgeable participation by the borrower has played an
important role in some tort actions brought by customers. The rationale is that
since violation of statute is actually negligence, the common law prin-
ciple of contributory negligence should be applied where the customer takes an
51 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 288B (1965) states in part:
The unexcused violation of a legislative enactment or an administrative regulation
which is adopted by the court as defining the standard of conduct of a reasonable man,
is negligence in itself.
See generally, W. PROSSER, LAW or TORTS § 36 '(4th ed. 1971) [hereinafter cited as PROSSER].
52 See, e.g., Landry v. Hemphill, Noyes & Co., 473 F.2d 365 (1st Cir. 1973), cert. denied
- U.S. -; Moscarelli v. Star, 288 F.Supp. 453 (E.D.N.Y. 1968).
53 81 F.Supp. at 1017.
54 Avery v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, 328 F.Supp. 677, 681 (D.D.C. 1971).
55 E.g., Moscarelli v. Staum, 288 F.Supp. 453 (E.D.N.Y. 1968).
56 See Note, Federal Margin Requirements as a Basis for Civil Liability, 66 CoLum. L.
REv. 1462, 1471-72 (1966).




active part in the violation. 8 In Bronner u. Goldman,9 a case in which the cus-
tomer was unable to recover losses incurred, there was strong dicta in both the
district court and court of appeals emphasizing that the plaintiff was thoroughly
experienced in market trading and therefore aware of the margin regulations.6"
The Sixth Circuit, in Goldman v. Bank of Commonwealth,"' denied tort recovery
to a customer against a bank that violated Regulation U. Although in that case
the court took notice of the fact that the customer represented to the bank that
the loans in question were for purposes other than buying regulated securities, it
concluded that "because... the customer knew that the loans violated Regula-
tion U, he ought not to be permitted to recover damages occasioned by his
wrongful acts."62
2. Tort Actions After Regulation X
Before issuance of Regulation X, the diversity of views among courts when
dealing with transactions in violation of margin laws was certainly significant to
the investor.6" How courts will treat a tort action by the borrower now that he,
too, may be in violation of a margin regulation is uncertain. The knowledgeable
investor will be precluded from recovery because it is clear that where there are
criminal penalties applied to a borrower who violates the regulations, he can no
longer be said to be in the class protected by the statute." Viewed from a dif-
ferent perspective, it is also evident that the borrower who knowingly violates a
margin regulation is contributorily negligent. 65
Nevertheless, the "lamb" borrower should still be successful in tort. A
buyer who makes an "innocent mistake" in "good faith" and takes remedial
action upon discovery is not in violation of Regulation X.6" It is clear that the
Federal Reserve Board did not intend the naive investor to be criminally liable;
58 Contributory negligence may consist of an intentional exposure to a danger of which
the plaintiff is aware. PROSSER 424. See also, RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 20 (1957).
59 236 F.Supp. 713 (D. Mass. 1964), aff'd 361 F.2d 759 (1st Cir. 1966), cert. denied
385 U.S. 933 (1966).
60 236 F.Supp. at 714; 361 F.2d at 761.
61 467 F.2d 439 (6th Cir. 1972).
62 Id. at 446.
63 Regulation X was issued Oct. 7, 1971, effective Nov. 1, 1971. 2 GCH FED. SEc. L. REP.
§ 22, 301 (1973).
There is a dispute among courts on the statute of limitations for private actions under § 7
of the Securities Exchange Act [15 U.S.C. 78g (1971)1. In Goldenberg v. Bache and Company
it was stated that an action based upon the Act or a regulation thereunder must be brought
both within three years after the violation and one year of discovery as required by the statute
at 15 U.S.C. § 78cc(b) (1973). 270 F.2d at 680. In Livingston v. Weis Voisin, Cannon, Inc.,
294 F.Supp. 676 (D. N.J. 1968), the court maintained that the provision in question does not
apply to private actions based upon § 7. Id. at 680. Professor Loss comments that in Golden-
berg "the court erroneously applied this statute of limitations to a customer's damage action
against her broker for violations of Regulation T ...." 3 Loss 1771 n. 296.
The appropriate statute of limitations would be that of the state where suit is brought for
tort or contract actions.
64 Whether the plaintiff's violation is a bar to the liability of the defendant depends upon
the legislative purpose found in the statute. If the purpose is to establish a standard for the
protection of the plaintiff, his contributory negligence will bar the action. There are, however,
some statutes that have been construed to put the entire responsibility on the defendant to
protect the plaintiff from his own negligence, i.e., child labor acts, fire statutes, factory acts for
protection of workmen. Margin regulations would not fall into that category. PROSSER 425-26.
65 See note 58 supra.
66 See text accompanying notes 29-32 supra.
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therefore, he stands in virtually the same position as he did before the issuance
of Regulation X. Judicial definitions of good faith and innocent mistakes will
vary. A reasonable measuring device would be to determine whether the bor-
rower has scienter. In the antifraud area of securities law, scienter is deemed
present when one has knowledge of the falsity of statements made.0 7 In this
context, it would translate into an understanding of the violation. Thus, a
rational rule for determining whether a borrower could recover in tort once a
violation is discovered is to ask whether the borrower knew at the time of the
transaction that he was in violation. If so he would be precluded from recovering.
The difficulty of maintaining an action under such a rule can be illustrated
by the decision of the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals in Gordon u. duPont
Glore Forgan, Inc. s Although the action was based upon a violation of New
York Stock Exchange margin rules, the position of the court is most probably
analogous to the view that will be taken by courts in similar actions under cur-
rent Federal Reserve Board regulations. In this case the broker inadvertently
permitted the customer's account to become undermargined. The customer was
aware of the mistake but took no action. When the broker eventually realized
he held the stock in violation of the rules, he sold the stock. The customer sued
to recover the losses sustained a. a result of the late sale. The court held that
where the plaintiff knows his account is undermargined and does not take
corrective action, he is precluded from recovering losses in a private civil
remedy. 9
In all likelihood few tort actions will be brought successfully, for only the
very imprudent broker will fail to inform his customer of margin requirements.
Where, however, the customer is unaware of his violation and the broker liqui-
dates the customer's account to his detriment without giving adequate oppor-
tunity to meet margin requirements, the law should provide the investor with a
remedy in tort.
B. Contract Actions
1. Actions under Section 29(b)
a. Prior to Regulation X
Section 29(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 provides that an
individual in violation of the statute or margin regulations thereunder cannot
enforce a contract that violates, or the performance of which violates, such reg-
ulations.o However, courts have chosen to hold contracts in violation of the Act
as voidable, not merely void. In Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite,7' the Supreme Court
held that the guilty party is precluded from enforcing the contract against an
innocent party but that such reasoning does not compel the conclusion that the
67 See Weber v. C.M.P. Corporation, 242 F.Supp. 321 (S.D.N.Y. 1965).
68 CCH FE.D. SEc. L. REP. (Current) f 94,313 (5th Cir. 1973).
69 Id. This is essentially the same as the holding in Goldman, 467 F.2d at 446.
70 15 U.S.C. § 78cc(b) (1971).
71 396 U.S. 375 (1970).
NOTES
NOTRE DAME LAWYER
contract is a nullity creating no enforceable rights in favor of the innocent party. 2
One not in violation may rescind or enforce the contract at his option. Section
29(b) has not yet been authoritatively construed by a federal court and state
courts have offered contradictory interpretations of a contract "the performance
of which involves a violation of" the Act or any regulation thereunder. Section
29(b) interpretations are most often required in the context of Regulation T
where the contract provides that the broker is to procure the stock and the
investor to pay for it.7" If the investor fails to pay and the broker fails to liqui-
date the sale in the proper manner, it is evident that the broker is in violation
of Regulation T. In such a case the violation is not evident on the face of the
contract and courts are in dispute as to whether or not the violation occurs
within the performance of the written contract.
The issue then is whether the customer can avoid the contract under §
29(b). Despite a strong dissent, a New York appellate court in Billings Asso-
dates, Inc. v. Bashaw74 held that the customer may not. 5 The court held that
§ 29 (b) applies only to contracts which by their terms violate the Act."6 Under
this ruling, although the broker may be in violation of a regulation, the customer
may not avoid his contractual obligation if the illegal action is not within the
terms of the contract. In fact, this rationale seems to provide that the customer
may be liable for breach of contract if he has not paid for the securities. In
California, a court reached a similar result in Gregory-Massari, Inc. v. PurkittY
The case involved a violation of Regulation T by the broker and a refusal to pay
for the stock on the part of the customer." In reversing the lower court decision
to void the contract, the court held that the broker was in violation of Regu.-
lation T because he failed to liquidate the customer's account properly. Never-
theless, the court held that since the contract only required the broker to sell
and the customer to pay, which had no illegal implication, the broker could
recover from the customer for the customer's failure to pay for the stock.7" The
court interpreted the provision voiding any contract "the performance of which
involves the violation of . . . any provision" to encompass only action that is
contemplated in the contract.8 " The court maintained that even if the contract
had encompassed liquidation and the broker did not liquidate, the contract
would still be viable.8 '
Another case directly on point takes the opposite view. In Staley v. Sal-
72 396 U.S. at 386-87. Lower courts agree. E.g., Serzysko v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 290
F.Supp. 74, 90 (S.D.N.Y. 1968), aff'd meem. 409 F.2d 1360 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied 396
U.S. 904 (1969); Staley v. Salvesen, 35 Pa. D. & C. 2d 318, 324-25 (C.P. Phila. 1963).
73 The problem does not arise often in Rezulation U violations because the parties usually
contract to loan money for specific collateral that is delivered to the lending institution at the
time the loan is made. Furthermore, purpose statements are required of borrowers which must
indicate the use of the loan and which therefore provide an indication of violations.
74 27 App. Div. 2d 124, 276 N.Y.S.2d 446 (1967).
75 27 App. Div. 2d at 128, 276 N.Y.S. 2d at 449 (1967).
76 27 App. Div. 2d at 126. Note the customer still has a cause of action in tort.
77 1 Cal. App. 3d 968, 82 Cal. Rptr. 210 (1969).
78 1 Cal. App. 3d at 970-71.
79 1 Cal. App. 3d at 973. If the customer had been able to void the contract he could have
rescinded and forced reimbursement by the broker.
80 1 Cal. App. 3d at 972.
81 Id. at 974.
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vesen, 2 a Pennsylvania court found that the contract was merely to sell securities
even though in the performance of the sale the broker granted an illegal exten-
sion. By granting the illegal extension, the broker violated Regulation T. There-
fore, the contract was voidable at the election of the customer.83 Loss maintains
in his treatise that this view appears more reasonable. s4 The Billings and Purkitt
interpretations leave a large loophole for evasion of margin regulations on the
part of the broker while still affording him a contract remedy for damages. As
stated by the dissenter in Billings, it would be a simple matter for a broker to let
it be known that he would not abide by the margin regulations, but would permit
customers to pay for securities in a variety of ways without entering such pro-
visions in the contract. 5 The obvious intent of § 29 (b) is to render uncollectible
those debts incurred in violation of margin regulations, thus acting as an added
enforcement mechanism.
No federal court cases appear to address this problem directly. 6 Never-
theless, some dicta are worth discussing. The court in Goldenberg v. Bache &
Company8 7 discussed the application of § 29(b) in an offhand manner. The
broker and customer had made a "Customer's Margin Agreement" which stipu-
lated that all transactions "shall be subject to the constitution, rules, regu-
lations.., of the Exchange or Board of Market ... [and] to the ... provisions
of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. '""8 A violation of Regulation T tran-
spired which was clearly not sanctioned on the face of the agreement. Yet the
court stated:
Granted that violations of the Act or Regulation entered into the sales or
purchases of which [the customer] complains, yet, before such contracts are
"deemed to be void," Mrs. Goldenberg's action must have been brought
[within the statute of limitations].8 9
The court implied that had the action been timely, the customer might have been
able to void the contracts. In Moscarelli v. Stamm,9" there was also a Regu-
lation T violation in the performance of but not within the four comers of the
contract. Although the court denied recovery to the customer in tort, it stated
in dictum that, "[f]or similar reasons plaintiffs' instigation or willful participation
in such violations would preclude their recovery by rescission under Section
29(b) of the Act." 1 The implication is that one innocent of wrongdoing may
be able to rescind a contract under § 29(b) where there is a violation which
is not indicated on the face of the contract. Thus, considering these few in-
stances, it would appear that when a federal court construes § 29(b), it is likely
to do so broadly. Nevertheless, all federal court judges that have recognized
82 35 Pa. D. & . 2d (0. P. Phila. 1963).
83 35 Pa. D. & 0. 2d at 325-26.
84 See Loss 3307 (Supp. 1969).
85 27 App. Div. 2d at 128, 276 N.Y.S. 2d at 449.
86 See Naftalin & *Co. v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 469 F.2d 1166,
1182 n. 25 (8th Cir. 1972).
87 270 F.2d 675 (5th Cir. 1959). The case was decided on other grounds.
88 Id. at 677.
89 Id. at 680 (emphasis added).
90 288 F.Supp. 453 (E.D.N.Y. 1968).
91 Id. at 460.
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the issue are not in agreement. Judge Friendly of the Second Circuit has stated
that he favors the narrow interpretation.9"
b. Effect of § 29(b) on Actions Brought under Regulation X
The implications of this controversy are important in actions brought
either in contract or under § 29(b) involving transactions covered by Regulation
X.93 Those parties who sue in courts that construe § 29(b) narrowly will find
that either party may sue for a violation of the contract as long as the violation
is not provided for in the contract. Even though § 29(b) exists, the broker in
violation of Regulation T would be able to sue the customer for any breach of
contract. On the other hand, the customer who is in violation of a regulation
for not satisfying margin requirements within the prescribed time could also sue
for delivery of stock once he has rendered the requisite amount. Actually, any
violation of a margin regulation which is not evident in the contract must be
treated separately from the contract action. Only if the violation is provided for
within the contract will a party be able to bring an action for rescission under
§ 29 (b). Since Regulation X causes the customer to be equally guilty with the
lender where the violation is knowing, neither party could claim innocence.
Thus § 29 (b) rescissions become an impossibility in most instances.
In those courts that interpret § 29(b) broadly, the contract will not be
enforced for either party if both knowingly violate a margin regulation in per-
formance of the contract. However, under the same rationale as that used in
tort, an investor who is unaware of the margin requirement may not be in vio-
lation of Regulation X.9" If he is not, he would be in the same position as one
before issuance of Regulation X and would be able to enforce or rescind the
contract. Under the same rationale, if a lender has been duped into an unknow-
ing violation by a fraudulent customer who is in violation of Regulation X, the
lender may rescind the contract under § 29 (b).
Where both parties are in violation, the courts will have little recourse but
to determine the contract void. If the contract is viewed as void with respect
to both parties, it would receive no legal sanction.95 Therefore neither party
could enforce it and the courts will merely leave the parties as they are. What-
ever contract may exist becomes a nullity and if there is a contractual obligation
remaining on the part of either party, performance will not be enforced. If,
after the sale of stock, there is a deficiency in the customer's account, he will not
be permitted to rescind or be reimbursed for what he has paid. Thus, in most sit-
uations where § 29(b) is read broadly, Regulation X will be available as a
defense for either the broker or the customer, because any party who is in viola-
tion of a margin regulation cannot rescind a contract under § 29(b). Thus §
29(b) rescission provides an important new weapon for the broker which was
92 Pearlstein v. Scudder & German, 429 F.2d 1136, 1149 (2d Cir. 1970) (dissenting
opinion).
93 Of course, these considerations are of importance only to those litigants who first hurdle
the innocent party criterion required by some courts.
94 See text accompanying notes 66-67 supra.




unavailable before the promulgation of Regulation X. However, rescission will
no longer be available to the guilty customer for offensive use.
Given that the contract is void as to both parties, the court may still grant
equitable relief in unusual situations. Although equity does not assume jurisdic-
tion on the ground that a contract is in violation of a statute, under particular
circumstances where equitable interference is necessary to give adequate protec-
tion to the interest of an innocent party which has been invaded, relief will be
fashioned accordingly.96
c. Section 29(b) Actions in the Context of Regulation U
The controversy over the scope of § 29(b) has much less importance in
the Regulation U area for two reasons. One is that the terms of the loan (X
dollars are lent and Y securities are put up as collateral) make evident the duties
of the parties and there is no provision that the securities will be delivered sub-
sequently. The other involves the requirement of purpose statements which must
be executed by the borrower and retained by the lender any time there is an
extension of credit collateralized by regulated stock." These two factors effec-
tively put most performance within the contract terms and therefore make the
contract void if there is a violation of margin regulations. An issue of importance
here, however, is the amount of reliance the lender may give to the truthfulness
of the borrower's statements. In Serzysko v. Chase Manhattan Bank,9" it was
held that Regulation U requires the lender to exercise reasonable diligence to
inquire and investigate as to possible misconduct on the part of the borrower.99
Since this is mandatory under Regulation U, it stands to reason that even if
the purpose statement causes the loan to appear proper, the contract still comes
under § 29 (b) if within the transaction the lender's performance does not meet
regulation requirements.' 0 Under this reasoning the narrow reading of § 29 (b)
could sustain an action for rescission as well as the broader reading. Thus, the
contract would be void for both parties. On the other hand, where the lender
uses reasonable diligence to investigate the loan and only at a later date finds
the true purpose, he would be able to rescind or enforce the contract at his option
because the borrower would have been in violation of Regulation X and the
contract would be voidable by the lender who would be an innocent party. 1 '
2. Application of Common Law Principles to Contract Actions
In some cases common law contract principles have played an important
96 See 27 Am. Jur. 2d Equity § 57 (1966). Injunctive relief is unlikely. Generally for an
injunction to issue a right must be violated and no rights are usually recognized under an illegal
contract. 43 C.J.S. Injunctions § 19 (1945).
97 12 O.F.R. § 221.3 (1973). See Serzysko v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 290 F.Supp. at
80-81. Note also that the borrower must prepare and retain records of loans received from
foreign creditors. 12 C.F.R. § 224.2(b) (1973).
98 290 F.Supp. 74 (S.D.N.Y. 1968), aff'd mem., 409 F.2d 1360 (2d Cir. 1969), cert.
denied, 396 U.S. 904 (1969).
99 290 F.Supp. at 90.
100 This is substantially different from the Regulation T controversy. See text accompanying
notes 70-96 supra. Here the loan itself is illegal.
101 The lender would also be able to recover damages for fraud.
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role in private suits arising under violations of margin regulations. In Golden-
berg v. Bache & Company, the court stated that such an "action could be looked
on as an action ex contractu, based on the contract between the stockbroker and
the customer as affected by the federal statute and regulations. .. ""', In effect,
past cases have held that the borrower, as an innocent party who is protected by
statute, is able to rescind a contract made voidable by the illegal action of the
lender."0 3 Actually, the threshold considerations in contract actions are similar
to the factors considered in actions brought under § 29 (b).
It has been held in such cases that even though one is innocent in a criminal
sense, he is not necessarily able to rescind. In Moscarelli u. Stamm," 4 an action
to rescind under § 29 (b), the court stated that a customer's instigation or willful
participation in violations would preclude recovery by rescission. 5 In Naftalin
& Co. v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc.,' the customer perpe-
trated on many brokers an elaborate scheme for short-selling stock. It was brought
to a costly halt when the market price of the stock in which he was dealing rose
unexpectedly. The court made it clear that the customer who was not an "un-
willing innocent party" would not be permitted to invoke § 29(b).'1" These
courts have followed the rationale espoused by the Supreme Court in Mills v.
Electric Auto-Litel' s where it was held that § 29(b) rescissions were possible
only at the instigation of "an unwilling innocent party."'0 0 The criteria used to
define "an unwilling innocent party" have not yet been measured exactly. In
Moscarelli the plaintiffs conspired with the defendant to violate the Act and
gambled with the defendant's funds with the expectation of reaping profits.""
In Naftalin the customer successfully deceived his brokers for a long period."'
In other cases not involving rescission under § 29(b), the courts have not
applied the Mills rationale but rather have looked to the common law and asked
if the parties were in pari delicto."' In Serzysko v. Chase Manhattan Bank, the
court appears to equate the two concepts."' Whether the courts claim to be
applying Mills or in pari delicto, it is evident that until now the criteria are
similar. It is generally recognized that where parties stand equally at fault in
the context of an illegal contract, the law will leave them where it finds them." 4
They are essentially in pari delicto. It is also recognized that a party to an illegal
agreement who is clearly not at fault will not be denied relief." 5 There can be
no question that this concept was applied in Naftalin. The use of "unwilling
innocent party" or, in actuality, the use of in pari delicto in these cases was an
102 270 F.2d at 680.
103 E.g., Myer v. Shields & Co., 25 App. Div. 2d 126, 267 N.Y.S.2d 872 (1966).
104 288 F.Supp. 453 (E.D.N.Y. 1968).
105 Id. at 460.
106 469 F.2d 1166 "(8th Cir. 1972).
107 Id. at 1182.
108 396 U.S. 375 (1970).
109 Id. at 387-88.
110 288 F.Supp. at 459.
111 469 F.2d at 1170-72.
112 See Serzysko v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 290 F.Supp. at 88-90 for a discussion of the
rationale.
113 290 F.Supp. at 89-90.
114 See MURRAY § 295.
115 See CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 1534 (1962).
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attempt to remedy a significant inadequacy of § 29 (b) : that one not in violation
of securities regulations could rescind the contract. Simply because the customer
is not criminally liable does not necessarily mean that he should not be responsible
for his losses."' Today the inadequacy no longer exists because the customer
under Regulation X is virtually precluded from bringing an action to rescind."'
Furthermore, it may be agreed that Regulation X is a mandate to view both
parties as in pari delicto in the context of a contract action.
C. Alternative Causes of Action
There are alternative actions that can be brought even if the contract is
determined a nullity under § 29(b). In Goldman v. Bank of Commonwealth,
the court noted that the lender may have a cause of action at law for money
lent," based on an allegation that there was a payment of money by the plain-
tiff to the defendant in the form of a loan." 9 It is generally recognized that in
this action all that must be pleaded is that money was lent. 20 Nevertheless, some
courts have held that it is necessary to have a statement of facts upon which an
implied contract could be constructed;"' at least one court appears to hold that
the suit must be based upon a contractual obligation."' This action would
permit the lender to recover the money owed on or advanced for the purchase
of regulated securities. Furthermore, all the equitable defenses are available to
the borrower."'
The Goldman court also recognized that there could be an action for mis-
representation on the part of the lender." 4 Actually, the court was referring
to the tort of deceit, a subcategory of misrepresentation. Deceit lies in cases
where the defendant knowingly makes a false representation with the intention
to induce the plaintiff to justifiably rely on it to his detriment."' This cause of
action could be used most effectively by Regulation U lenders where the bor-
rower misrepresents himself on the "purpose statement" for the loan. However,
it must be noted that the lender may find he is under a stricter standard here
because under Regulation U he is charged with investigating the truthfulness of
the borrower's statement."' Courts may hold that unless he has fulfilled this
obligation, he may not recover for deceit, because his reliance would not be
justified. On the other hand, the court may hold that Regulation U has no
116 Id. at § 1537; RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 604 (1932).
117 Note there may be a circumstance in which the customer is not in violation of Regula-
tion X and will be able to rescind the contract even though his stock is not margined correctly.
See text accompanying note 66 supra.
118 467 F.2d at 447.
119 See 58 C.J.S. Money Lent § 2a (1948).
120 See 28 U.S.C. APPENDIX - RULES OF CML PROCEDURE FORM 6- Complaint for
money lent (1971).
121 E.g., Foley-Carter Ins. Co. v. Commonwealth Life Ins. Co., 128 F.2d 718 (5th Cir.
1942).
122 Hester & Wise v. Chinn, 162 S.W.2d 450 (Tex. Civ. App. 1942).
123 58 C.J.S. Money Lent § 4 (1948).
124 467 F.2d at 447.
125 See PROSSER 685-86.
126 290 F.Supp. at 90.
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effect on the tort since both parties are at fault and hold the lender to the care
of a reasonably prudent man," 7 rather than the stricter standard.
A different cause of action was used successfully by the borrower in Billings:
conversion.'2 8 Courts have reasoned that where the broker sells the securities
of a customer carried on margin, the broker must give reasonable notice of the
time and place of the sale. Failing to do this leaves him liable for conversion
of the securities.'29 The plaintiff's position as a violator of Regulation X should
have no effect on the action except to give him notice of the sale at the prescribed
time.' Beyond this, the same rules that apply to a defendant who has violated
a statute apply to a plaintiff. Certainly § 7 of the Securities Exchange Act and
regulations issued thereunder requiring sale of undermargined stocks were not
promulgated for the purpose of providing notice of forced sales. Where the
broker sells at a later time without notifying the customer, he has effectively
converted the customer's stock. 1
D. Lender Liability Under 'the "Enforcement Doctrine"
Although the whole concept of private liability for violation of margin
regulations rests upon public policy and acts as an enforcement mechanism, most
courts maintain that the suit by the borrower is bounded by common law con-
cepts. A few courts, however, have permitted the customer to recover without
regard to any of the concepts discussed above and look at the customer's action
purely as an unencumbered method of enforcement. They appear to permit
customer recovery in any situation where the lender has violated a margin pro-
vision. Regulation X may force a rethinking of these cases.
1. Enforcement Doctrine in the Absence of Regulation X
Pearlstein v. Scudder & German,' decided by the Second Circuit, is the
principal case in this area. It was held in Pearlstein that a customer has a private
right of action against his broker for violation of federal margin regulations,
regardless of his sophistication or knowing participation in the transaction.'
The ultimate result is that the broker becomes almost strictly liable for damages
occasioned by the customer in any transaction where he breaches an applicable
regulation. The court held that:
127 See PROSSER 715-17.
128 27 App. Div. 2d at 127. The court took the narrow view on voidability of a contract to
buy securities and permitted recovery in conversion to prevent the broker from reaping benefit
from an unlawful act.
129 Mayer v. Monzo, 221 N.Y. 442 (1917); Content v. Banner, 184 N.Y. 121 (1906).
130 It could be argued that presumption of knowledge of the forced sale provision of
Regulation X could not be used by the broker in this manner because the purpose of the regula-
tion is not to give notice to the customer that his stock will be sold at a specific time if he has
not paid for it.
131 Damages are computed by the highest value of the securities prevailing during a
reasonable period following the date of notice of the conversion. 27 App. Div. 2d at 127.
132 429 F.2d 1136 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 1013 (1971). Noted, 56 IOWA L.
REv. 446 (1970); 66 Nw. U.L.Rav. 372 (1971).
133 Id. at 1140-41.
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the danger of permitting a windfall to an unscrupulous investor is out-
weighed by the salutary policing effect which the threat of private suits for
compensatory damages can have upon brokers and dealers above and beyond
the threats of governmental action by the Securities and Exchange Corn-
mission.'34
The court refused to recognize the defense of in pari delicto. This defense was
dismissed rather tersely by a citation to Perma Life Mufflers, Inc. v. International
Parts Corp.,"3 5 an antitrust case, for the proposition that in pan delicto was
undermined in securities law.
The court in Pearstein broke rather significantly from the tort rationale
of Remar and its progeny, probably in an effort to avoid the strong arguments
against recovery based upon tort.' Instead, it used the same rationale as that
espoused by the Supreme Court in J. I. Case Col. v. Borak"' There it was
decided that an implied private right of action exists for a violation of § 14(a)
of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,' which deals with regulation of proxy
statements. The Borak Court based its decision on the principle that private
enforcement of the proxy rules provides a necessary supplement to SEC action
and compared it to the antitrust situation where treble damages serve as an
effective weapon for enforcement. 40 It is important to realize that this type of
suit is not based upon a mandate from Congress or necessarily upon a reading
of the statute implying a private action; it is based upon a judicial recognition
that an additional enforcement mechanism is needed. The Peaistein court
wisely qualified this rationale somewhat by stating that an investor who mis-
represents himself is not entitled to recover. 4
Judge Friendly addressed the enforcement doctrine in his dissent in Pearl-
stein. He argued that the private suit in margin enforcement was not furthering
the purpose of the statute because Congress intended only to prevent widespread
margin violations and that the SEC could do that effectively. 4 2 He also stated
that the ultimate effect of the ruling would be to induce the customer to engage
in margin violations since he would be in a "heads-I-win, tails-you-lose" situa-
tion."
Some courts appear to have followed the Pearlstein reasoning,' but most
still apply the common law tort and contract defenses.'4 5 However, one case,
134 Id. at 1141.
135 392 U.S. 134 (1968). There the Court held that the doctrine of in pari delicto would
not bar a retailer from suing a manufacturer for antitrust violations when the retailer had been
coerced into joining the illegal agreement.
136 429 F.2d at 1141.
137 Causation and actual Congressional intent are significant problems that are difficult to
deal with in the tort context. See Note, Federal Margin Requirements as a Basis for Civic
Liability, 66 COLUMB. L. RV. 1462 (1966); text accompanying notes 51-62 supra.
138 377 U.S. 426 (1964).
139 15 U.S.C. § 78n (a) (1971).
140 377 U.S. at 432.
141 429 F.2d at 1141.
142 Id. at 1147-48.
143 Id. at 1148.
144 E.g., Bowman v. Hartig, 334 F.Supp. 1323 (S.D.N.Y. 1971); Avery v. Merrill Lynch,
Pierce, Fenner & Smith, 328 F.Supp. 677 (D.D.C. 1971).
145 E.g., Landry v. Hemphill, Noyes & Co., 473 F.2d 365 (1st Cir. 1973); Goldman v.
Bank of Commonwealth, 467 F.2d 439 (6th Cir. 1972).
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Spoon v. Walston & Co., Inc.,'46 relied upon Perma Life to support its holding
that there would be no application of common law barriers to the customer's
action and indicated responsibility must be placed upon the broker. 47 It was
held that the customer could rescind, even though each party was at fault in an
equitable sense. Thus the court fashioned an equitable remedy: the customer's
loss was shared equally.'48 In affirming the decision, the Sixth Circuit Court
of Appeals expressly adopted the Pearlstein view.'49
2. Regulation X and the Enforcement Doctrine
Decisions as to the enforcement doctrine for actions brought under Regu-
lation X appear slight. It is likely to be held that since the Federal Reserve
Board provided that the borrower is liable for violation of margin regulations,
it would be unjust to reward him for his wrongdoing. 5 Many courts will add
that even if the action aids enforcement, it certainly encourages violation by the
customer. Nevertheless, those courts that have adopted the Pearlstein viewpoint
may very well continue to follow the enforcement rationale analogizing to the
antitrust situation established by Perma Life. Regardless of the fact that both
of those courts refused to accept the defense of in pani delicto, it remains to be
seen whether that defense will be rejected entirely in securities actions.
It must be noted that not all of those who concurred in the result of Perma
Life agreed with the opinion. Justice White stated that he would deny recovery
where the plaintiff and defendant bear substantially equal responsibility for the
resulting injury. Only where one party was responsible for originating, negotia-
ting, or implementing the scheme would he permit recovery. 5' Justice Fortas'
view was similar. He stated that if the fault of the parties is reasonably within
the same scale then in pani delicto would bar recovery.'52 Justices Marshall and
Harlan with whom Justice Stewart concurred shared similar views. They would
deny recovery where the parties show active participation in the formation of
an illegal scheme and stand equally at fault by cooperating with each other.'53
It is likely that if the equities of Perma Life had not been so clearly in favor of
the plaintiffs, the defense of in pari delicto would not have been rejected.' 4
Essentially, these Justices were not primarily concerned with whether the plaintiff
was in a legal or illegal position but rather the extent to which he participated in
the illegal enterprise.
Construing the participation rationale espoused by five members of the
Supreme Court in the margin regulation context would indicate a denial of
146 345 F.Supp. 518 (E.D. Mich. 1972), aff'd per curiam, 478 F.2d 246 (6th Cir. 1973).
147 Id. at 521.
148 Id. at 522-23.
149 Spoon v. Walston & Co., Inc., 478 F.2d 246 (6th Cir. 1973), af'g per curiam 345
F.Supp. 518 (E.D. Mich. 1972).
150 Title III of the Bank Records Act leaves the loophole that the SEC could exclude any
class from regulation. The SEC specifically applied Regulation X to domestic borrowers.
151 392 U.S. at 145.
152 Id. at 147.
153 Id. at 149-53.
154 The defendant granted franchises to the plaintiffs only under terms that were restrictive




recovery to a great number of cases. Most often the lender and borrower each
participate equally in the illegal transactions; both are aware of their actions and
neither forces an illegal scheme on the other. In such a case they would be in
pari delicto. Certainly, in those violations in which the customer deceives the
bank or where the broker takes advantage of a "lamb" investor, recovery would
be permitted. However, in the majority of transactions there would be no private
enforcement.
Nevertheless, in at least one case both parties were found to be in active
violation of securities regulations, and yet the court rejected an in parn delicto
defense and permitted recovery based upon the enforcement doctrine. Both
parties in Nathansan v. Weis, Voisin, Cannon, Inc.'55 were in violation of Rule
lOb-5 which prohibits fraudulent activities in the sale of securities.:' 8 The
defendants were insiders who gave "privileged" inside information to the plain-
tiffs who then bought stock from others believing they would reap huge profits
in subsequent sales. The buyers found to their dismay that the tips they received
did not produce the results they expected. The buyers sued for their losses.
The defendants were in violation for releasing inside information and the plain-
tiffs were in violation for not disclosing what they knew to the sellers from whom
they bought the stock. The defendants pleaded in pari delicto, maintaining that
the plaintiffs were in active violation of lOb-5. The court denied the defense,
maintaining that the overriding public policy considerations to secure effective
enforcement of the antifraud provisions of the Securities Act must be given
effect. 5 " It was decided that the most important party, the public, could be
protected best by discouraging insiders from making disclosures. The circum-
stances here are very similar to those found in the margin violation area with
Regulation X in effect. Both parties actively engage in transactions that may
cause harm to the public. Ultimately, the use of the enforcement doctrine be-
comes a matter of weighing personal rights and long-standing tradition against
the good of the public.
VI. An Argument for the Enforcement Doctrine
By following the enforcement doctrine strictly without recognition of an
in pari delicto defense on the part of the broker, the courts can best effectuate
the purposes of margin regulation. The objective of the Securities Act of 1934
and Title III of the Bank Records Act of 1970 was regulation of credit in such
a way as to protect the public, the securities community, and finally, as a by-
product, the customer. The best way to achieve protection of these people is to
minimize the appeal of an illegal credit arrangement.
If no private actions are permitted, there will be little deterrent to violate
margin regulations. The lender would feel relatively secure in making illegal
transactions knowing the customer could not charge any losses to him in private
actions. Considering the past record of inefficiency of the SEC in monitoring
155 325 F.Supp. 50 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
156 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1973).
157 325 F.Supp. at 53.
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the activities of security lenders, Judge Friendly's argument, that widespread
violations would be stopped by public sanctions, loses its persuasiveness. The
parties could simply agree to violate the regulations knowing there is little like-
lihood of public discovery. Under such conditions, it appears that high-leverage
credit could become rather commonplace.
If private actions are recognized but common law defenses permitted, only
those who have been defrauded, such as the "lamb" investor or the lender who
has been deceived, will be able to recover. The vast majority of transactions take
place between parties who fall within these two extremes. Therefore, most of
those in the securities field could simply agree to violate knowing that an in pari
delicto or contributory negligence defense would prevent either of them from
suing the other successfully. Another consideration is the rather unsophisticated
borrower who does not understand margin requirements and the process of
liquidation and who therefore needs protection. Although he may not be truly
blameworthy, he will be unable to gain redress as long as he has been informed.
Even he would be in violation of Regulation X. Permitting the private action
based upon the enforcement doctrine, but also recognizing the defense of in pari
delicto, will solve this issue only at the expense of much litigation.
By establishing a clear policy of customer recovery under the enforcement
doctrine, all these problems will be solved. Permitting the customer to recover
may induce customers to attempt to violate margin regulations as stated by
Judge Friendly, but the deterrent effect upon the lender would be much greater.
No creditor would provide the customer with illegal credit knowing that the
blameworthy borrower might prevail in a subsequent law suit. Creditors would
not be tempted to lend illegally. Moreover, as between the institutional creditor
and the borrower, the lender who is in the stock market every day presents the
greater potential threat to undermining protection intended for the public. It
appears that anything less grants to the lender the privilege of gambling. By
making the creditor strictly liable to the borrower, the public purpose of com-
plete credit management can best be achieved while at the same time protecting
all borrowers from their own ignorance.
Finally, the most significant criticism of the enforcement doctrine, protection
of the guilty borrower at the expense of the lender, is overcome in two ways.
First of all, it should be recognized that the lender is in control; the borrower
cannot force him to extend credit. Only the creditor can decide whether he
should violate the regulations and subject himself to liability. Secondly, in a
very short time the issue would become moot because there would be much less
illegal credit and the institutional lender would not be exposed to possible suit.
Moreover, as has been shown above, in the antitrust context and in at least one
area of securities regulation, courts have determined that private interests must
yield to protection of the public as a whole. If credit regulation is genuinely
economically important to the public, then margin regulation deserves the same
consideration.
VII. Conclusion
The future of private actions under Regulation X can largely be forecast
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by the past. Courts were in little argeement then and it is unlikely there will be
much uniformity in the future unless the Supreme Court makes a definitive
ruling. Nevertheless, some generalities can be made. Regulation X does not
condemn all private actions. Where one of the parties to a margin transaction
is undeniably taking advantage of the other, legal and equitable principles will
provide remedies. Under § 29(b) actions, the "lamb" investor as well as the
lender who has been deceived will be able to rescind. Even though recovery in
tort will be very rare, other causes of action may lie.
Nevertheless, Regulation X has created a twofold problem. It appears
likely that most courts will not permit recovery where the parties are in pari
delicto, which will preclude private actions for the overwhelming majority of
illegal transactions. The second part of the problem concerns protection of the
unsophisticated borrower who, though not really blameworthy, has been in-
formed of his margin obligation. If the enforcement doctrine is accepted, but
limited by an in pan delicto defense, this problem may be solved. Nevertheless,
the enforcement problem remains.
Those courts that follow the lead of the Pearlstein and Nathansan decisions
which recognize the unencumbered enforcement doctrine, will best effectuate
the policies of margin regulation. However, at this point it appears that most
courts will not permit such unfettered recovery on the part of the borrower.
Nevertheless, it is clear that by consistently finding the creditor liable, the courts
would maximize compliance with margin regulations, a goal which ought to
be their foremost concern.
Timotky W. Silbaugh
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